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EXCAVATING THE NEW 
REPUBLIC 
EXCAVATING THE NEW REPUBLIC 
Post-colonial Subjectivity in Achebe's Things Fall Apart 
by Christopher Wise 
"[I]t may be productive [today] to think in terms of a genuine 
transformation of being which takes place when the individual 
subject shifts from purely individual relations to that very differ- 
ent dynamic which is that of groups, collectives and communi- 
ties ... The transformation of being ... is something that can be 
empirically experienced ... by participation in group praxis-an 
experience no longer as rare as it was before the 1960s, but still 
rare enough to convey a genuine ontological shock, and the 
momentary restructuration and placing in a whole new perspec- 
tive of the kinds of private anxieties that dominate the monadized 
existence of the individual subject" 
-Fredric Jameson "Interview" (82) 
Introduction 
After Frantz Fanon's and Aime Cesaire's devastating critiques of Placide Tempels' 
La philosophie bantoue in the mid-1950s, the hermeneutic and logocentric quest to 
recuperate the more overtly ontological dimensions of African culture became theo- 
retically suspect, if not wholly untenable, following nearly three decades of specula- 
tion about Leopold Sedar Senghor's negritude, which is now widely dismissed as an 
under-theorized metaphysics of blackness.1 Today, Fanon's and Cesaire's analyses of 
Tempels' book seem more viable than ever. In a recent study by Kwame Anthony 
Appiah, for example, we receive due warning about the dangers of overglorifying the 
otherness of pre-colonial African culture, especially for the sake of commodifying its 
art. Furthermore, Appiah demonstrates how contemporary African writers have 
tended to reject the Western mandate that they recreate or reify the lost alterity of their 
past; or, borrowing from Sara Suleri, Appiah argues that many African artists and 
intellectuals do not wish to serve as "otherness machines" for late capitalist, consum- 
er society (157). Like Fanon and Cesaire then, many contemporary post-colonial 
critics are concerned about recent efforts to commodify African being, especially for 
the sake of merely enriching the West's powerful university system, or its growing 
complex of art and ethnological museums. 
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Additionally, as Fanon has observed in Black Skin, White Masks (1982), most purely 
academic celebrations of African ontology, as found in the work of Tempels, Leo 
Frobenius, and many others, tend to disregard the more pressing social and political 
needs of the present. Responding to Tempels' La philosophie bantoue, Fanon warns 
specifically that "[i]t is not a matter of finding Being in Bantu thought, when Bantu 
existence subsists at the level of nonbeing, of the imponderable" (185-86). Fanon goes 
on to dismiss efforts like Tempels' as "rubbish" [scandale] and his rejection is no less 
categorical than Cesaire's, who in Discourse on Colonialism (1972) demonstrates even 
less sympathy with Tempels' work than Fanon (34-39). Cesaire, in fact, characterizes 
Tempels' book as "slimy and fetid" [vaseuse et mephitique] (34), ironically ridiculing 
Tempels' generosity and missionary zeal (38). "Since Bantu thought is ontological," 
Cesaire quips, "the Bantu only ask for the satisfaction of an ontological nature. Decent 
wages! Comfortable housing! Food!" (38-39). 
Given then the on-going and disproportionate distribution of the world's wealth, 
as well as more pedestrian problems in Africa like starvation, AIDS, and civil-war, 
first world scholars and teachers must never lose sight of the scandalous disjunction 
between their own privileged experience and the experience of oppressed Africans in 
places like Angola, Somalia, and the Sudan. To quote Ngugi wa Thiong'o, first world 
intellectuals must ceaselessly remind their constituency that the very water they 
drink is often "taken from the mouths of the thirsty," and the food they eat is 
"snatched from the mouths of the hungry" (Barrel of a Pen 74). In this sense, any purely 
abstract theorization of pre-colonial African being must stand condemned as worse 
than irrelevant: The harsh reality of contemporary existence in Africa would seem to 
dictate that immediate social and material demands must take precedence over spec- 
ulatory efforts by scholars like Temples or Frobenius to reconstruct Africa's pre- 
colonial past. Another way of saying this might be to accept Fanon's argument that no 
true culture can come to life under such oppressive social conditions as currently 
exist, or that "[it] will be time enough to talk of the black genius when the man has 
regained his rightful place" (Black Skin, White Masks 187). 
Nevertheless, we must also pause to consider whether or not it is possible, in the 
first place, to undermine the Manichean legacies of the colonizing process without 
first interrogating the ontological status of Africa's precolonial past, specifically by 
reconstructing it within a necessarily allegorical and "violent" semantic framework.2 
Though such an approach obviously denies the hegemony of most contemporary anti- 
hermeneutic methodologies, particularly more vulgar post-structuralist varieties 
that endorse an absolute concept of difference, this study is undertaken with the 
conviction that Achebe's novel Things Fall Apart is worthy of close analysis not simply 
because it offers insight into the purely structural or syntactic dynamics of European 
colonialism,3 but also because of its visionary exploration of the pre-Manichean and 
ontological status of the pre-colonial Igbo people. 
However, in the context of contemporary late capitalist society, especially in the 
United States and Western Europe, there would seem to be obvious difficulties in 
bringing the Igbo experience of being, as described by Achebe, into the interpretive 
horizon of a dramatically different First World orientation towards social reality.4 
Still, I would insist that meaningful and benign experiences of collective being have by 
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no means been wholly eradicated from contemporary existence in the West, uncanny 
though they may be. Here, I would cite Jameson's pertinent observation that opposi- 
tional scholars today need to reappropriate an authentically dialectical concept of 
ontology, or collective social being, an observation which he draws from the writings 
of Raymond Williams, Ernst Bloch, and Jean-Paul Sartre.5 I would also cite Martin 
Heidegger's key hermeneutic concept regarding thefacticity of Being, or the notion 
that "even if we ask, 'What is 'Being'?, we [nevertheless] keep within an understand- 
ing of the 'is,' though we are unable to fix conceptually what that 'is' signifies" (Being 
and Time 24-25). In "The Writer and His Community," Achebe himself has argued that 
while cultural differences should be respected, they should not be emphasized to the 
extent that one falls "into the trap of seeing the differences as absolute rather than 
relative" (59).6 Thus, while Achebe has consistently attacked the universalizing 
impulses within colonialist criticism and discourse, he nevertheless recognizes that 
totalizing philosophies of difference are both dogmatic and counter-productive 
insofar as they dismiss hermeneutic understanding altogether. In this sense, we may 
also reread Appiah's concern about the way in which African artists seem to be recast 
into the role formerly assumed by alienated modernist artists-namely, to be produc- 
tive "otherness machines" for a vacuous First World marketplace-as a parallel 
rejection of the "post-structuralist" insistence on non-identity wherein the possibility 
of sameness is absolutely rejected. 
Instead of focusing upon the disintegration of the basic psychic coordinates or 
mechanisms of Achebe's Igbo,7 in the following essay, we will focus upon the 
emphatically historical question of pre-European Igbo being in Things Fall Apart, 
especially as it pertains to the larger objectives of contemporary post-colonial theory. 
In this regard, I will suggest that Achebe's description of Igbo community life 
functions not only as a Fanonian "negation of a negation" (or counter-weight against 
previous literary distortions of Africa),8 but it also functions as a prophetic affirma- 
tion of post-colonial Africa's future by offering a teleological vision of a post- 
Cartesian or collective subjectivity. Achebe's depiction of the pre-European Igbo may 
therefore be brought into alignment with more recent efforts by post-colonial theo- 
rists like Abdul R. JanMohammad, Edward W. Said, Fredric Jameson, and many 
others to introduce a uniquely post-individualistic and collective subject-position, 
symbolically located at the "other end of historical time" (Jameson, "Imaginary and 
Symbolic in Lacan" 110).9 
Achebe and Western Philosophy 
In a lecture given at UCLA in 1984, Achebe has described Rene Descartes as both 
"the father of Western philosophy" and "the cause of a gigantic philosophical 
accident" ("The Writer and His Community" 50-51). Specifically, Achebe rejects the 
narrowness and egocentrism of Cartesian philosophy, or the cogito ergo sum of 
Descartes, which, he argues, functions as a defining aspect of contemporary life in the 
United States, for Achebe, the historical site of an enormous "ontological accident" 
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(51). As a foil to Descartes, Achebe also suggests that, in the unlikely event that 
Socrates, Plato, or Augustine returned to the modern era, they would no doubt find 
African community life, like that which is described in Things Fall Apart, more 
appealing to them than Western individualism (50-51). To emphasize the utopian 
dimensions of these thinkers, Achebe remarks that 
The Republic... was after all a grand design for the ordering of men 
in society; and The City of God a Christian reordering of society 
after the destruction of the Roman Empire by pagans. In other 
words, philosophy for Plato and Augustine, historically equidis- 
tant from Christ, was concerned with architectural designs for a 
better world. 
Expanding upon this thesis, Achebe particularly singles out Augustine by stating 
that, while recent Western literature and theory has encouraged us to think of 
contemporary social existence as life within a prison-house,10 he himself prefers the 
Catholic or Augustinian vision of social being defined as "other-centered fulfill- 
ment," or as a potentially benign "presence limiting the space in which the self can 
roam uninhibited" (53).11 
Though unexpected, Achebe's views on Augustine tend to remind us of a fact that 
nearly fifteen hundred years of Christian domination in the West have tended to 
obscure: namely, that Augustine's City of God is primarily mystical and theurgical 
rather than legislative (O'Meara xxx). In this sense, Augustine does not so much offer 
an oppressive blueprint for Roman Catholic theocracy, as much as he offers an 
astonishing vision of a better world, a utopian standard by which earthly and corrupt 
cities may be measured and found wanting. Obviously, as a Neo-platonist philoso- 
pher, Augustine draws upon Plato's Republic in drafting his own new "republic" that 
is refracted through the lens of Christian doctrine and mysticism. While in Things Fall 
Apart Achebe does not really offer an elaborate utopian scheme like Plato in The 
Republic, he does create an alternative universe or reality in which community life 
indeed turns upon the Augustinian notion of "other-centered fulfillment" that is 
lauded in Achebe's speech: the notion of community life as a "presence" that 
deliberately and creatively restricts the freedom of individuals, but in non-oppressive 
ways (Achebe, "The Writer and His Community" 53). 
In this sense, Achebe aims not only at rehabilitating Africa's pre-colonial past; he 
also wants his novel to fulfill a more primal human need by providing "an alternative 
handle on reality" (58). To this end, Achebe lauds Frank Kermode's definition of 
fictional reality as "'something we know does not exist but which helps us to make 
sense of, and move in, the world"' ("The Truth of Fiction" 139); and he rejects Milan 
Kundera's definition of the novel as "'an investigation into human existence ... [that] 
proclaims no truth, no morality'" because it denies the novel's also important didactic 
and social functions ("The Writer and His Community" 55). In other words, far from 
evading political and social responsibility to community, Achebe asserts that the task 
for the novelist is rather to imaginatively bring into being a wholly "different order of 
reality from that which is given" ("The Truth of Fiction" 139, my emphasis). 
1057 
This content downloaded from 140.160.178.168 on Fri, 9 May 2014 14:05:55 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
CALLALOO 
However, it should be clear that if Things Fall Apart offers an alternative vision of 
a pre-Cartesian and pre-alienated African past, it does not necessarily follow that the 
ontological aspects of Achebe's novel may therefore be conflated with the theological 
ones, which would be equivalent to suggesting that Achebe's description of the pre- 
colonial Igbo is essentially Edenic or mythical. On the contrary, Achebe describes an 
emphatically historical form of social existence, which nevertheless remains utopian 
in character. First, Achebe does not hesitate to dramatize the very real socio-historical 
crises and contradictions among the Igbo people, many that exist long before the 
arrival of the British, and that later create opportunities for the spread of Christianity. 
In fact, it is by now commonplace to assert that post-colonial African writers like 
Achebe, in recreating the pre-colonial past, wish to demonstrate that the era before the 
arrival of Europeans was neither idyllic nor savage, but was instead "composed of 
real and vulnerable people, their ancestors, not the figments of missionary and 
colonialist imaginations" (Lawrence 9).12 
However, Achebe goes further than this by insisting that Africa's pre-colonial past 
was in many ways creatively superior to its historical European counterpart.13 Taking 
issue with reviewers of Yambo Ouologuem's Bound To Violence, for example, Achebe 
argues that, while pre-colonial Africans certainly had their share of faults, they 
nevertheless were not responsible for the basic historical fact of racism's existence, 
especially as a systematic doctrine or creed (79).14 Another way of saying this might 
be that, while Achebe's Igbo in Things Fall Apart do not inhabit an Edenic paradise, 
they nevertheless are not guilty of essentializing the Other on the basis of race, which 
is a distinctly European problem. Additionally, Achebe suggests that his Igbo do not 
suffer from the harmful attributes of a Cartesian and alienated world-view, or from 
a primal detachment from being itself. In short, if the Igbo in Achebe's novel do not live 
within an idyllic paradise, they do inhabit a utopian space that is free from the 
contradictions of both Cartesian logic and racist ideology.15 
Malignant Fictions: or, Achebe and Historical Situation 
Before delineating the more formal features of this non-Cartesian utopian space, it 
is important to acknowledge, at least in passing, the documented failures or obvious 
social contradictions of the pre-colonial Igbo in Things Fall Apart, especially their 
"caste" system, their practice of ritual murder (whether due to oracular promptings, 
or due to their fear of biological twins), and their oppressive patriarchy, particularly 
evident in the case of Okonkwo. In his essay "The Truth of Fiction," Achebe himself 
offers one helpful way of approaching these problems when he praises a scientific 
study of infant mortality in modern-day Nigeria, which he describes as both "poi- 
gnant" and "perspicacious" (142), and when he criticizes the practices of a contempo- 
rary Nigerian witch-doctor, which he describes as both "maniacal" and "pitiful." 
However, for Achebe, Dr. Sanya Onabamiro's Why Our Children Die does not neces- 
sarily offer a better solution to the problem of infant mortality in Nigeria merely 
because he offers a scientific one; rather his ideas are preferable because they are both 
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imaginatively and creatively superior to those of his superstitious counterpart. 
Hence, Achebe argues that 
the insights given by Dr. Onabamiro into the problem of high 
infant mortality, however incomplete future generations may 
find them, are infinitely more helpful to us than the diagnosis of 
a half-mad religious fanatic. In conclusion, there are fictions that 
help and fictions that hinder. For simplicity, let us call them 
beneficent and malignant fictions. (143) 
Achebe's approach to this question may have been informed by the work of Claude 
Levi-Strauss, whom Achebe draws from in establishing his own informal theories of 
myth and language ("Language and the Destiny of Man" 136-37).16 In this regard, 
Achebe implies that, regardless of the particular aesthetic, religious, or cultural form, 
all symbolic expressions of human culture function in the first instance as creative 
responses to their various social situations, or they function as dynamic attempts to 
resolve the various crises of material necessity in the on-going historical struggle to 
"wrestle a realm of freedom from the realm of necessity" (Marx, Capital III 820). When 
Nwoye abandons Okonkwo's obi for the Christian mission, for example, Achebe tells 
us that "[i]t was not the mad logic of the Trinity that captivated him ... It was the 
poetry of the new religion, something felt in the marrow" (Things Fall Apart 104). More 
specifically, Nwoye finds in the new religion a more satisfying "answer [to the] 
persistent question that haunted his young soul-the question of the twins crying in 
the bush and the question of Ikemefuna who was killed" (my emphasis). 
Thus, while Nwoye may be overwhelmed by the poetry of the new religion, he is 
actually indifferent to its objective content, which he does not understand.l7 For 
similar reasons, the stigmatization of specific tribal members as osu, or taboo outcasts, 
also tends to facilitate the success of the Christian missionaries (111), though Achebe 
seems to imply that the problem of patriarchy among the Igbo is more specific to 
Okonkwo rather than the tribe as a whole. In other words, Okonkwo's misogyny is 
largely a personal failing, resulting from the exaggerated shame and aversion he feels 
for his father (9-10). Still, throughout the novel, the attitudes of Igbo men towards 
women are often depicted by Achebe as both harmful and repressive at best.18 
We may conclude then that if Achebe believes the pre-colonial Igbo enjoyed a less 
alienated form of social existence before the arrival of the British, he also implies that 
it was, in many instances, a less humane one. Even Okonkwo, for example, is sickened 
by the death of Ikemufuna, though he himself plays the largest role in it (44). Later, 
Achebe describes Obierika, a tribal elder, as being disenchanted with oppressive Igbo 
traditions such as the "throwing away" of twins and other seemingly arbitrary social 
customs (87), the former affecting him personally. Towards the novel's conclusion, 
Achebe also states that "there was a growing feeling [among the Igbo] that there might 
be something in [the new religion] after all, something vaguely akin to method in the 
overwhelming madness" (126). Besides the question of the twins, the osu, and other 
unsatisfactory tribal customs, this growing feeling about the new "lunatic religion" is 
also strengthened by the fact that the British had significantly improved the local 
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economy, so that now "much money flowed into Umuofia." Additionally, to the 
increasing dismay of Okonkwo, the Igbo become appreciative of the white man's 
medicine as well as his government and his schools (128-29). 
Nevertheless, Achebe's even-handedness in depicting the positive imports of 
British culture should not blind us to the novel's more fundamental aim: that is, as we 
have already seen, to create a wholly alternative fictional reality as a means of 
engaging and modifying existing colonial and post-colonial societies (Achebe "The 
Truth of Fiction" 139). In this regard, what may be most remarkable about Things Fall 
Apart is its ability to both deploy and subvert the traditional European novel form 
itself in the service of purposes distinct from those which have historically defined it. 
Specifically, Achebe transforms the "bourgeois epic" of homelessness and alienation 
into a recuperative celebration of collective social existence. 
Pre-Colonial Igbo Ontology in Things Fall Apart 
Though the theoretical writings of Frantz Fanon may be classified as a radical 
variety of phenomenological existentialism, especially insofar as they are grounded 
in the Marxian philosophy of Jean-Paul Sartre, many contemporary post-colonial 
theorists prefer to emphasize the more tenuous connections between Fanon and more 
popular theorists like Jacques Lacan.19 It is at least ironic, however, that the critic who 
is chiefly responsible for alerting us to the dangers of celebrating African ontology 
was himself an old-fashioned hermeneutic or even logocentric thinker. In other 
words, despite the efforts of Homi K. Bhabha, and many other contemporary critics, 
Fanon was by no means a post-structuralist or Derridean thinker, largely because he, 
like Sartre before him, posits a pre-linguistic (or pre-symbolic) form of human 
consciousness.20 However, not only Fanon but Achebe as well respects the now 
"anachronistic" hermeneutic distinction between text and being, or the currently 
unpopular bifurcation between what Wilhelm von Humboldt once termed Sprache 
[articulated language] and Rede [ontological speech].21 
In his essay "Language and The Destiny of Man," for example, Achebe, states 
specifically his view that "language is not inherent in man-the capacity for language, 
yes; but not language. Therefore there must have been a time in the very distant past 
when our ancestors did not have it" (88, my emphasis). The implications of the 
theoretical distinction made by Achebe have been developed most fully in Heideg- 
ger's Being and Time (1926), where Sprache, or the ordinary language of daily life, is 
separated from Rede, which is defined as the ontologically prior human faculty for 
ordinary discourse (203-4). In this sense, Achebe's belief about the dual nature of 
language may not be incidental to his descriptions of the pre-colonial Igbo in Things 
Fall Apart but may instead be that which enables him to explore the dramatic 
possibilities of an alternative form of subjectivity, which is fundamentally non- 
alienated, pre-Cartesian, and collective in orientation. 
In other words, while Heidegger advocated that we develop a new relationship to 
language, rejecting our present-day relationship with language as a barrier that 
prevents us from an experience of ontological plenitude, Achebe creates an alterna- 
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tive utopian reality in Things Fall Apart wherein its inhabitants enjoy the kind of 
relationship with their language that Heidegger advocated. However, I am not 
suggesting that the actual Igbo people themselves enjoyed such a non-alienated 
relationship with their language, which is of course both immaterial to my thesis and 
indeterminate. In fact, Achebe himself asserts that his descriptions of the Igbo people 
are "merely localized impressionistic illustrations taken from [his] own experience of 
growing up in Ogidi in the 1930s and 1940s" ("The Igbo World and Its Art" 66), and 
he also suggests that the world of his childhood probably exists at present only in his 
dreams (67). Hence, whatever the Igbo people actually are or were, the fact remains 
that the text of Achebe's Things Fall Apart, like that of Heidegger's Being and Time, 
functions in the first instance as a socially symbolic attempt to imagine a radically 
alternative form of community existence in which human experience is not based 
upon a Cartesian subject-object duality, and in which human beings enjoy a more 
dynamic, non-alienated relationship to their language. 
Heidegger's notion of Dasein [Being-there] suggests that, before the "nightmare" 
of post-Socratic history, human beings first existed in a world in which the human 
mind was not fundamentally distinct from matter. However, it is crucial to Heideg- 
gerian thought that there also must have existed a semantic dimension to the world 
of Dasein [or, the nonsubjective individual] before that world could be expressed 
linguistically. Heidegger's Rede [Speech], like Achebe's notion of an innate human 
"capacity" for language, is therefore the ontologically prior "openness" without 
which it would be impossible for Sprach [articulated language] to come into being. 
Like Schleiermacher and Humboldt, Heidegger then establishes two distinct spheres 
of language, a higher realm in which authentic meaning may occur and a lower realm 
of common, ordinary or "fallen" language.22 However, while in the early Heidegger, 
Dasein [or "man"] serves as Being's privileged space of disclosure, the later Heidegger 
moves towards a more radical anti-humanism in which Dasein is no longer the 
ultimate locus of truth and meaning. In other words, the later Heidegger, not unlike 
the later Saussure, makes the emphatically anti-Cartesian assertion that it is language 
and not the subject that speaks (Unterwegs zur Sprache 12). Furthermore, the later 
Heidegger also suggests that it is in poetic language itself, or poetic language as Logos, 
that the ultimate "unconcealment" [alethia] of both truth and being occurs. But he also 
insists that Rede, defined throughout his writings in terms of ontological silence, must 
remain the necessary precondition for the "unconcealment" of Being (Erlauterungen 
zu Hilderlins Dichtung 69). 
In contemporary Western society, which Achebe has characterized as an ontolog- 
ical "mistake," it is commonly assumed that language originates from the speaking 
subject, a notion that Achebe dramatically rejects in his depiction of the pre-colonial 
Igbo. In other words, if Heidegger depicts the individual being [or Dasein] as the 
object (rather than the subject) of metaphysical thought, Achebe depicts the pre- 
colonial Igbo in Things Fall Apart as similarly inhabiting a world in which there seem 
to be no speaking subjects in any strictly Cartesian sense. For example, when the 
Umofia Igbo are called by name from outside their huts, they exhibit a marked 
suspicion of their language, which they seem to view as an autonomous, powerful, 
and reifying force: 
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'Ekwefi!' a voice called from one of the other huts. It was 
Nwoye's mother, Okonkwo's first wife. 
'Is that me?' Ekwefi called back. That was the way people 
answered calls from outside. They never answered yes for fear it 
might be an evil spirit calling. (29) 
This brief illustration suggests that the basic epistemological orientation of Achebe's 
Igbo is radically different from that of what Achebe calls, "the true modern, Western 
man [who has] made the foundation of his philosophical edifice, including the 
existence of God, contingent on his own first person singular" ("The Writer and His 
Community" 51). Ekwefi's refusal to automatically validate the interpolation of her 
name into any form of disembodied language also suggests the pre-colonial Igbo's 
awareness of language's more violent and oppressive features, an epistemological 
sophistication notably absent in the order of things of the Cartesian West. 
Achebe makes clear throughout Things Fall Apart, as well as throughout his non- 
fictional essays, that he believes the Igbo have experienced a fundamentally different, 
if not superior, relationship between their lived bodies and their discursive language 
than any presently known in the modern world. Hence, when the egwugwu, or the 
judicial branch of Igbo society, address individual members of the local community, 
they always refer to each individual as a "body" rather than a name (64). Similarly, 
Achebe informs us that during festivals, ritual occasions, or periodic social crises, the 
masked forms or figures of long-dead ancestors will often return to the community, 
now "speaking an esoteric dialect in which people are referred to as bodies: 'The body 
of so-and-so, I salute you!"' ("The Igbo World and Its Art" 66). As in the case of 
Ekwefi's refusal to directly engage any disembodied or unseen voice, in all of these 
instances Achebe's Igbo seem to exist more as objective products of metaphysical 
thought rather than the masterful, subjective agents that populate the Cartesian West. 
Furthermore, Achebe describes the defining or interpolating discourse of the pre- 
colonial Igbo as an "esoteric" dialect or language that is largely inaccessible to the 
"living" person (Things Fall Apart 63), a seemingly anachronistic awareness that the 
totality of language is never entirely available to the individual subject or Dasein.23 
In both the text of Things Fall Apart and in his published essays, Achebe has 
consistently affirmed the importance of traditional folk "literature" itself, especially 
as a discursive network of proverbs, aphorisms, and metaphors that adds coherence 
and unity to the lives of individuals within the community. In Things Fall Apart, 
Achebe demonstrates the importance of folk wisdom and "literature" with repeated 
reference to Igbo proverbs and folk-tales, a narrative strategy which, in fact, stabilizes 
and undergirds the novel's most basic structure.24 Similarly, Achebe demonstrates 
how the folk wisdom of the pre-colonial Igbo enables the historicity of the past to 
serve a meaningful purpose within the time of the present, facilitating "comings and 
goings" between "the land of the living" and the "domain of the ancestors" (85). Not 
surprisingly, Achebe has reaffirmed in a recent interview his largely conservative 
view that people who don't have any sense of their own history must be condemned 
to "starting again every day," or to beginning again as "new men in the world every 
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day and this is terrible [my emphasis]" (Talking With African Writers 54). In regards to 
recently evolving concepts of a collective subject position, it may therefore be worth 
considering Achebe's view that there is no better preparation for survival within the 
disorienting world of modernization than the study and preservation of the tradition- 
al cultures of the past ("What Has Literature Got to Do with It" 170). 
Additionally, Achebe's description of the Oracle of the Hills and Caves in Things 
Fall Apart implies that the pre-colonial Igbo may live at a time when the necessary 
ontological conditions are present for what Heidegger called the "unconcealment" 
[alethia] of truth and beings. First, Heidegger's celebration of ontological silence, a 
necessary precondition so that authentic Language [or Logos] might speak, is dramat- 
ically echoed by Achebe in his characterization of pre-colonial Igbo community life in 
terms of its "vibrant" (7), "complete" (39), and even "perfect" silence (8). As Walter 
J. Ong might put it, Achebe's Igbo seem to be "rooted in a 'speaking silence"' 
(Interfaces of the Word 23). Additionally, Achebe shows us that the Oracle of the Hills 
and Caves is not simply a terrifying supernatural voice but also a pragmatic mediator 
within the community, giving personal advice, resolving disputes (12), and advising 
about warfare (9). On occasion, the Oracle can even be teased if its demands seem 
either unreasonable or dubious (15), not unlike Heideggerian notions of the Logos as 
playful or ludic.25 
While homologous in some ways with much recent post-structuralist theory, 
Achebe's views on language's autonomy in pre-colonial Igboland should neverthe- 
less not be confused with either Roland Barthes's fetishizing of the text, or the 
Derridean notion that "there is nothing outside of the text" (Of Grammatology 158). In 
fact, Achebe's depiction of language's unique role in human affairs more closely 
parallels the post-Kantian and anthropological linguistics of Wilhelm von Humboldt, 
the intellectual precursor of Heidegger.26 Like the Igbo in Things Fall Apart, speakers 
in Humboldt's linguistic system are both shaped or molded by language, which is 
described by Humboldt as a creative and autonomous force [ergon], but they also 
possess an inward or "in-dwelling" sense of language's "prelinguistic" or semantic 
dimensions [energeia]. The word is therefore not only outside the monadic subject; it is 
also "a living potential in the human interior" (Ong The Presence of the Word 232). As 
George Steiner puts it, "language is a 'third universe' midway between the phenome- 
nal reality of the 'empirical world' and the internalized structures of consciousness" 
(81, my emphasis).27 Humboldt himself writes, "Even though language is wholly inward, 
it nevertheless possesses at the same time an autonomous, external identity and being which 
does violence to man himself" (82). 
In Things Fall Apart, as we have seen, Achebe shows us how the Igbo possess an 
uncanny awareness of language's often harmful and alienating nature, the powerful 
being of language that evokes in its subjects of Igboland the greatest caution and 
dread. This is most evident, for example, in the case of Ikemufuna of whom the Oracle 
demands a ritual sacrifice. However, we are also shown how the Igbo are not (as in 
Barthes, Derrida, and other poststructuralists) the "pure" products or "constructs" of 
their language (that is to say, the purely powerless products of human language), but 
they are instead endowed with a strikingly logocentric and powerful individualism, 
an in-dwelling ability to determine their own fate, status, and well-being within the 
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real or historical world.28 This is especially evident in the case of Okonkwo whom, 
Achebe informs us, is "one of the greatest men of his time" (6). 
In the opening lines of the novel, Achebe states plainly that Okonkwo's consider- 
able fame throughout the land is the result of his "solid personal achievements" (3), 
and that Okonkwo is a man "clearly cut out for great things" (6). Achebe also 
emphasizes that Okonkwo's flaws, as well as his strengths, are uniquely his own, 
rather than the result of any specific social or historical contradictions among the Igbo 
people. Okonkwo's fear of failure, for example, is described by Achebe as "deeper and 
more intimate than the fear of evil and capricious gods and of magic" (9). From the 
beginning of the novel, we are told, Okonkwo's fear is "not external but [lies] deep 
within himself [my emphasis]." In his essay, "The Writer and His Community," Achebe 
makes this point even more plainly by asserting that "[t]he Igbo are second to none in 
their respect of the individual personality" (57). Achebe adds that "the Igbo posit an 
unprecedented uniqueness for the individual by making him or her the sole creation 
and purpose of a unique god-agent" (57-58). The Igbo belief that individuals within 
the community possess a personal god or chi reaffirms Achebe's suggestion that 
human subjects are not only constituted by either language in its outward and more 
"violent" dimensions, but they are also endowed with a prelinguistic and deeply 
inward capacity to understand their world. Achebe tells us, for example, that 
Okonkwo's personal success was not regarded by the Igbo as the result of his own luck 
or good fortune (19); rather the Igbo believe that Okonkwo achieves success chiefly 
through his own initiative, illustrated by Achebe with the Igbo proverb that "[w]hen 
a man says yes, his chi says yes also." This is not to say, however, that one's "chi" is 
strictly self-interested. For example, when the character Chielo assumes the role of 
priestess of Agbala, Achebe describes her as someone who is literally "possessed by 
the spirit of her god" (70), her very body at times transformed in "fantastic" and 
"miraculous" ways (75). Early in the novel, Achebe states that "[a]nyone seeing 
Chielo in ordinary life would hardly believe she was the same person who prophesied 
when the spirit of Agbala was upon her" (35). Later, when Ekwefi, the first wife of 
Okonkwo, follows Chielo and her daughter to the Oracle of the Hills and Caves, 
Chielo is portrayed by Achebe as "inhuman" if not monstrous (75). 
Finally, the fictional representation of a collective form of subjectivity in Things Fall 
Apart dramatically affirms Achebe's vision of community life that offers a sense of 
"other-centered fulfillment" to its inhabitants ("The Writer and His Community" 53). 
This principle is demonstrated throughout Things Fall Apart by way of the ceremony 
of the kola nut, a sacramental ritual that binds the Igbo community together and 
provides a context within which meaningful human exchange may occur. "To bring 
the kola," we are told, "is to bring life" (5). Extending authentic courtesy to one's 
guests, or extending welcome to the Other, for Achebe's Igbo, serves as the necessary 
foundation of civil society. Hence, during the New Yam Festival, Achebe tells us that 
"every man whose arm was strong ... was expected to invite large numbers of guests 
from far and wide" (26). In fact, an individual's most basic humanity for the pre- 
colonial Igbo seems directly related to his or her willingness to serve as a generous 
host to others within the community (81). Achebe seems to imply then that the social 
and ethical obligation of welcoming the Other must be fundamental to any coherent 
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concept of subjectivity within human society. Any notion of being in Things Fall Apart 
must therefore be defined in terms of the subject's most basic ethical obligation to the 
Other, as an Emmanuel Levinas, for example, might advocate, rather than in any 
anarchistic or postmodernist sense of being as a kind of non-dialectical or highly 
aestheticized subjectivity (if it can still be called that).29 
Conclusion 
Though Achebe rejects the stereotypical characterization of Africa as a place where 
"there are no real people ... onlyforces operating [Achebe's emphasis]" (Talking With 
African Writers 56), he has also described the Igbo World as "an arena for the interplay 
of forces... a dynamic world of movement and of flux [and] restless dynamism" ("The 
Igbo World and Its Art" 62). However, for Achebe, the pre-colonial Igbo world is 
finally a lost world, or a world that remains significant only within the immediate 
context of present day political struggle within Africa (Talking With African Writers 
50). Hence, we must not forget that, in the second half of Achebe's novel, Okonkwo 
becomes a quixotic figure of sorts, his suicide at the conclusion serving as a symbolic 
marker by which we can measure the extent of the Igbo community's deterioration or 
secularization.30 In other words, in the second half of the novel, Achebe focuses upon 
the dissolution of Igbo ontology, or upon the disintegration of the most basic social 
and psychological structures of the pre-colonial Igbo, as well as the imposition of a 
whole new set of organizing structures: most obviously, a Cartesian rather than an 
ontological and collective subjectivity. 
In Black Skin, White Masks, Fanon has observed that "every ontology is made 
unattainable in a colonized and civilized society" (109). Like Fanon, Achebe suggests 
that for the pre-colonial Igbo to be inducted into colonial society, the abandonment of 
a previously more collective social form of existence is henceforth mandated, so that 
the physically painful construction of a colonized subjectivity may be violently 
imposed upon the native: namely, a Manichean subjectivity. It is in this sense that the 
second half of Achebe's Things Fall Apart dramatically depicts the peripeties of the 
Manichean drama, or it depicts the "slow composition of [the] self as a body in the 
middle of a spatial and temporal world" (Fanon, Black Skin, White Masks 111). The 
concluding tragedy of Okonkwo is therefore the tragedy of a novel-hero for whom it 
is utterly impossible to undergo Fanon's Manichean restructuration of self and world. 
Nevertheless, a strictly Fanonian approach to Things Fall Apart, as we have seen, 
cannot finally do justice to the complexity of Achebe's novel, nor to the historical 
situation to which encomiastic novels like Things Fall Apart respond. This is, in part, 
because Fanon (like most theorists of his generation) fails to take into account the 
unavoidably logocentric basis of his own philosophical position, most evident in his 
precipitous dismissal of Tempels' La philosophie bantoue. If Fanon, Cesaire, and others 
once had good reason for marginalizing the largely well-intended (if untimely) efforts 
of Tempels', there may now be good reason for us to reevaluate this road not taken. 
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In other words, while the ultimate priority of Africa's basic material needs must be 
continually reasserted within the first world context, as Ngugi rightly reminds us, the 
West's present course of steadfast and deliberate deafness to these needs makes such 
condemnations seem unhelpful luxuries, the privileged rancor of a comprador intel- 
ligentsia. In the American academy, for example, where the "pragmatic" and neo- 
Liberal separation of the spheres of the personal from the political routinely prohibits 
"deontological" moral praxis,31 it seems unlikely that any significant changes in 
present attitudes towards relations of uneven distribution of the world's economic 
resources will be forthcoming. In such a context, it may well be asked how such reform 
can take place until the dramatic lifeworlds of Africans like Achebe can be effectively 
transported into the interpretive horizons (or "lifeworlds") of those who inhabit the 
more privileged West. Whatever the historical significance of Things Fall Apart for 
modern Nigerians and other postcolonial Africans, what may therefore be most 
crucial about Achebe's novel for us today is the hermeneutic understanding that it 
engenders, its effective clearing of our own false prejudices so that our most basic 
humanity may be awakened. 
However, if Achebe's novel is successful in this regard, its success stems from the 
fact that it addresses a truly transcultural, even universal, dilemma of post-oral 
humanity, which is not strictly an economic question: that is to say, the demise of what 
Ong calls "oral-aural" cultures wherein the Eventness of the Spoken Word is increas- 
ingly forgotten (The Presence of the Word 17). It is therefore entirely fitting that 
Okonkwo's tale concludes with his cryptic marginalization as a brief footnote within 
the history text of a British colonizer. While Okonkwo's tragedy is specific to colonial 
Igboland, and to the colonial encounter throughout the African continent, it also 
speaks to many far-reaching aspects of humanity's changing relationship to language 
during the last six hundred years.32 In this sense, the story of Okonkwo does not really 
belong to Africa alone but to the entire human race. 
NOTES 
1. See Rene Menil's Tracees: Identite, negritude, esthetique aux Antilles, Rene Depestre's Bonjour et 
adieu a la negritude, James Clifford's "A Politics of Neologism: Aime Cesaire" in The Predicament 
of Culture, Amiri Baraka's chapter "Aime Cesaire" in The Leroi Jones/Amiri Baraka Reader, and 
Onwuchekwa Jemie Chineweizu and Ihechukwu Madubuike's "The Leeds-Ibadan Connec- 
tion: The Scandal of Modern African Literature." 
2. See Theodor W. Adorno's Aesthetic Theory (321). Also see Jameson's Late Marxism, where we 
find the comments that in his Aesthetic Theory, Adorno demonstrates how "the reifying impulse 
in modern art [and its criticism] is affirmed as a necessity and evaluated positively" (21). One 
may also refer to the Benjaminian notion of allegory in this context, which is defined here in 
terms of an emphatically self-negating constellation or Darstellung [representation] (50). 
3. In an interview entitled "The Post-modern Condition: The End of Politics?," Gayatri Spivak 
states her agreement with Pierre Macherey that the main task for us today "is not to recover a 
lost consciousness, but to see ... the itinerary of the silencing [my emphasis]" (31). 
4. The concept of "horizon" employed in this essay may be found in Martin Heidegger's Being and 
Time. Translators John Macquarrie & Edward Robinson's comment that while "[w]e tend to 
think of a horizon as something which we may widen or extend or go beyond, Heidegger seems 
to think of it as something which we can neither widen nor go beyond, but which provides the 
limits for certain intellectual activities performed 'within it' [my emphasis]" (lff). Also see 
Hans-Georg Gadamer's Truth and Method (302-7). 
5. See Jameson "Interview" (82). 
1066 
This content downloaded from 140.160.178.168 on Fri, 9 May 2014 14:05:55 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
CALLALOO 
6. In discussing his experiences teaching African literature in the United States, Achebe also 
relays the following anecdote: "I remember a white American boy who came to me very tense, 
after reading Things Fall Apart, and saying 'This Okonkwo is my father!' Now I'd never in my 
wildest dreams thought of Okonkwo as a White Anglo-Saxon Protestant! But this is what 
literature is about and why it's worth doing. Otherwise why go to America to teach African 
literature?" (Talking With African Writers 56). 
7. See Fanon's discussion of Mannoni's Prospero and Caliban: The Psychology of Colonization in Black 
Skin, White Masks (96-97). 
8. For example, Abdul JanMohammad's chapter "Chinua Achebe: The Generation of Realism," 
in Manichean Aesthetics, specifically employs a Fanonian interpretive model, encapsulated by 
Fanon's well-known three "stages" of the colonized writer's intellectual development, which 
are enumerated in The Wretched of The Earth (222-23). 
9. See JanMohammad and David Lloyd's "Introduction: Toward a Theory of Minority Discourse: 
What Is To Be Done?," where they state that "[t]he project of systematically articulating the 
implications of [a collective] subject-position ... must be defined as the central task of the theory 
of minority discourse" (9). Also, see Anders Stephanson's "Regarding Postmodernism: A Conver- 
sation with Fredric Jameson"; Edward Said's "Orientalism Reconsidered"; David F Ruccio's 
"Failure of Socialism, Future of Socialists?"; and Jean-Luc Nancy's The Inoperative Community. 
10. For example, see Foucault's discussion of Jeremy Bentham's panopticon in Discipline and 
Punish: The Birth of The Prison, or Max Weber's rather monolithic description of contemporary 
society as an "iron-cage" in The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (181). 
11. As the son of Anglican Christians, Achebe has written that Augustine's very name and 
ecclesiastical title, which he saw as a boy inscribed in his father's copy of The West African 
Churchman's Pamphlet, seemed for him to possess an "elusive and eternal quality, a tantalizing 
unfamiliarity which [he] always found moving" ("Named for Victoria, Queen of England" 37). 
Like Malcolm X, who described Augustine as a great black African saint (The Autobiography of 
Malcolm X 368), Achebe seems to find in Augustine a philosophical ally who shares many of his 
deepest concerns and convictions. 
12. Lawrence is quoted appreciatively in Achebe's essay "Colonialist Criticism" (Hopes and 
Impediments 81). 
13. For example, Achebe argues that the art of Africa mostly revitalized an exhausted European 
art, following the various discoveries of Picasso and others of masks and sculpture from Africa. 
See Achebe's "An Image of Africa: Racism in Conrad's Heart of Darkness" (16-17) and "Colonial- 
ist Criticism" (88-89). 
14. For a helpful though brief introduction to the historical development of systematic theories of 
race in Europe, see Paul Bohannan and Philip Curtin's Africa and Africans (50-61). 
15. In fact, the former may very well establish the basic epistemological conditions which tended 
to facilitate the validation of the later. 
16. For example, see Levi-Strauss's discussion of body painting practices among the Caduveo 
Indians in Brazil (Tristes Tropiques 196-97), which Jameson builds upon in The Political 
Unconscious (77-80), and Levi-Strauss's similar observation in The Savage Mind [La pensee 
sauvage] that "the savage mind totalizes" (245). 
17. For Nwoye, Achebe tells us, the very words of the new Christian hymns were "like the drops 
of frozen rain melting on the dry plate of the panting earth" (Things Fall Apart 104). 
18. For example, Okonkwo and a friend are shocked at the thought that there might exist some 
tribes where the children belong to the wife rather than the husband, and at the suggestion that 
a woman might lie on top of a man during sexual intercourse (Things Fall Apart 51). However, 
Achebe does emphasize that the Igbo word for medicine [agadi-nwayi] means "old woman" (8- 
9), implying that the tribe's power comes from the feminine, and that, despite Okonkwo's 
persistent hatred for women, for the Igbo people in general, the motto "Mother is Supreme" 
seems to be a more characteristic attitude towards the feminine (94). Furthermore, while 
neighboring tribes may "haggle and bargain [for a bride] as if they were buying a goat," Achebe 
suggests that the Umuofia-Igbo are generally less misogynistic in their own practices (51). 
Achebe himself comments as follows: "There is an ambivalence to women in traditional [Igbo] 
society ... [T]here are these attitudes that suggest that there are two streams in the minds of 
our people: one in which women are really oppressed and given very low status and one in 
which they are given very high honor, sometimes even greater honor than men, at least if not 
in fact, in language and metaphor. I think this suggests that in this situation the role of the 
woman has not yet been fully worked out, that we are still ambivalent about it" (Talking With 
African Writers 53). 
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19. For example, see Homi K. Bhabha's "Remembering Fanon: Self, Psyche, and the Discourse of 
Colonialism" (xix-xx). 
20. For example, Fanon often suggests that subjective desire is in fact prior to one's interpellation 
into language, as when he asserts the following: "I came into the world imbued with the will 
to find a meaning in things, my spirit filled with the desire to attain to the source of the world, 
and then I found that I was an object in the midst of other objects" (Black Skin, White Masks 109). 
While it is commonplace to suggest that existentialism served in history as both the ethical and 
political branch of phenomenology, many contemporary post-colonial critics have been reluc- 
tant to fully articulate the theoretical implications of Fanon's indebtedness to phenomenolog- 
ical and hermeneutic philosophy. One notable exception is Henry Louis Gates, Jr., who has 
recently argued that we must "rehistoricize" Fanon, rather than transform him into "a kind of 
icon or 'screen memory"' (470). 
21. See Kurt Mueller-Vollmer's "Introduction" (12-17). 
22. In opposition to the hegemony of Derridean theory, this distinction is also preserved by 
Marxist theorists like Walter Benjamin, Theodor Adorno, Fredric Jameson, and numerous 
others. 
23. Note Heidegger's pertinent comment that "the perceiving of what is known is not a process of 
returning with one's booty to the 'cabinet' of consciousness after one has gone out and grasped 
it; even in perceiving, retaining, and preserving, the Dasein which knows remains outside, and 
it does so as Dasein [Heidegger's emphasis]" (Being and Time 89). 
24. In the text of Things Fall Apart, Igbo proverbs are cited on sixteen separate occasions, and 
folktales are retold on eight occasions. 
25. For example, note the following brief anecdote: "When [Obiako's] father had not been dead 
very long, he had gone to consult the Oracle. The Oracle said to him, 'Your dead father wants 
you to sacrifice a goat to him.' Do you know what he told the Oracle? He said, 'Ask my dead 
father if he ever had a fowl when he was alive.' Everyone laughed heartily except Okonkwo, 
who laughed uneasily because, as the saying goes, an old woman is always uneasy when dry 
bones are mentioned in a proverb. Okonkwo remembered his own father" (Achebe, Things Fall 
Apart 15). 
26. If Heidegger's proclivity for fascist politics renders him suspect today, it is well to remember 
that politically cogent theorists like Walter Benjamin, Theodor Adorno, Fredric Jameson, and 
many others are also heirs to Humboldt's linguistic legacies. To align Achebe with Heidegger 
does not then necessarily imply that one "depoliticizes" him (although this is clearly a danger). 
27. Anticipating Jameson's more politicized account in The Political Unconscious (108-9) and Late 
Marxism (67), George Steiner in After Babel shows us how the implications of Humboldt's 
linguistic theories have scarcely been realized or appreciated at present, especially Hum- 
boldt's insights into those potentially harmful attributes of language that are largely outside 
human control (82).Steiner states at greater length, "More than a century before the modern 
structuralists, Humboldt notes the distinctive binary character of the linguistic process: it 
shares, it mediates between, the crucial antinomies of inner and outer, subjective and objective, 
past and future, private and public. Language is far more than communication between 
speakers. It is dynamic mediation between those poles of cognition which give human 
experience its underlying dual and dialectical form" (83). 
28. Achebe's development of a "collective" or postcolonial subject position therefore radically 
departs from recent developments in Western postmodernist theory suggesting the possibility 
of a "schizoid" or "fragmented" subjectivity, as found, for example, in the writings of Deleuze 
and Guattari, as well as Jean Baudrillard, and others. Also, see JanMohammad and Lloyd's 
"Introduction: Towards a Theory of Minority Discourse" (15-16). 
29. See, for example, Michel Foucault's often-cited "break" with the dialectic and the advent of the 
"mad philosopher," i.e., the retreat into the psychological monad (Language, Counter-Memory, 
Practice 41). For a more recent and technologically-oriented account of the "postmodern 
subject," also see Mark Poster's "A Second Media Age?" (80-84). 
30. Any investigation of Okonkwo as quixotic hero would also need to be recast in terms of 
competing Marxian meta-narratives, pitting the tribal versus the imperial and/or capitalist 
modes of production proper, rather than, say, old-fashioned feudal and mercantile (or early) 
capitalist modes of production in 16th-century European society (Jameson, The Political 
Unconscious 95). For example, before the arrival of the British missionaries in Eastern Nigeria, 
the Igbo community in Things Fall Apart already trades in maize (24) and tobacco (27), both 
fruits of the Colombian exchange. Additionally, many Igbo, like Okonkwo, possess firearms 
and are cognizant of the existence of both white men and slavery (99), despite the relative 
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isolation from non-Igbo cultural currents. 
31. Besides the often-cited writings of Richard Rorty, Edith Wyschogrod articulates this position 
in her "deontological" study of contemporary moral theory, Saints and Postmodernism. 
32. See Ong's Interfaces of the Word (17-22). 
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